Review and analysis of fire and explosion accidents in maritime transportation by Baalisampang, Til et al.
                             Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for Ocean 
Engineering 
                                  Manuscript Draft 
 
 
Manuscript Number: OE-D-17-01170R2 
 
Title: Review and analysis of fire and explosion accidents in maritime 
transportation  
 
Article Type: Review  article 
 
Keywords: Shipping accidents; fire and explosion; preventive measures; 
alternative fuels 
 
Corresponding Author: Professor Faisal Khan, PhD 
 
Corresponding Author's Institution: Memorial University 
 
First Author: Til  Baalisampang  
 
Order of Authors: Til  Baalisampang ; Rouzbeh Abbassi, PhD; Vikram  
Garaniya, PhD; Faisal Khan, PhD; Mohammad  Dadashzadeh, PhD 
 
Abstract: The globally expanding shipping industry has several hazards 
such as collision, capsizing, foundering, grounding, stranding, fire, and 
explosion. Accidents are often caused by more than one contributing 
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accidents that occurred in the maritime transportation industry during 
1990 to 2015. The underlying causes of fire and/or explosion accidents 
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properties more suitable than traditional fuels in mitigating fire risk 
and appropriate management of their hazards could make them a safer 
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1. Introduction 29 
The shipping industry is expanding globally, leading to an increase in worldwide 30 
shipping traffic (Hetherington et al., 2006; Tournadre, 2014; Yip). The growing number of 31 
marine vessels may lead to a rise in maritime hazards and accidents. Akten (2006) stated that 32 
shipping is, and always will be, full of risks despite increasing safety standards and improved 33 
technology. Celik et al. (2010) stated that the system complexity and automation, human 34 
error, human-centred system design, and potential design-based failures are different 35 
perspectives for ongoing shipping accidents. Due to this, international maritime authorities 36 
have made significant efforts to promote safety in the shipping industry (Hetherington et al., 37 
2006; O’Neil, 2003) but despite this, there are still a high number of shipping accidents 38 
reported in recently published statistical reports (Baltic Sea Maritime Incidence Response 39 
Group (MIRG), 2017; Darbra and Casal, 2004; Eleftheria et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2012). 40 
Shipping accidents by type are numerous, but common examples are collision or contact, 41 
capsize, foundering, breaking up, grounding, stranding, and fire or explosion (Akten, 2006). 42 
Broadly, human error, technical and mechanical failure, and environmental factors are 43 
common causes leading to shipping accidents but with different percentages (Karahalios, 44 
2015; Uğurlu et al., 2015). The Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) (2002) 45 
database, considered eight types of possible causes of general accident, namely mechanical 46 
failure, impact failure, human error, instrumental failure, services failure, violent reaction, 47 
external events and upset process conditions. According to Allianz Global Corporate and 48 
Specialty (2017) foundering (sunk, submerged) wrecked/stranded (grounded), fire/explosion, 49 
collision (involving vessels), machinery damage/failure and hull damage have been the most 50 
frequent causes of losses at sea over the past decade (2007-2016).  51 
Accidents are often assigned to a single category such as grounding, fire or explosion, 52 




































































accidents are caused by more than one contributing factor or sequence of undesirable events 54 
(Papanikolaou et al., 2007; Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987). Most literatures relating to 55 
shipping accidents (Butt et al., 2013; Bužančić Primorac and Parunov, 2016; Roberts et al., 56 
2013) have highlighted the causal factors for general shipping accidents but root causes of a 57 
particular event are often ignored. For instance, human error can lead to collision which in 58 
turn may cause fire and explosion. In this case, if there are no causal factors for human error 59 
as the root cause, then human error, collision and its subsequent events would not have 60 
occurred. In order to prevent the consequences of all these events, causal factors for human 61 
error are required to be addressed. This indicates that the determination of root cause and 62 
potential safety barriers of any accident type are vital in order to prevent accidents.  63 
In the past, a significant number of shipping accidents involved fire and explosions 64 
(Akten, 2004; Roberts and Marlow, 2002; Roberts et al., 2012). For instance, Darbra and 65 
Casal (2004) found that 29% and 17% of accidents in seaports are caused by fires and 66 
explosions respectively. Bulk carrier casualties world-wide, taken from Lloyd’s records 67 
between 1980 and 2010, confirm that fires and explosions caused 19% of accidents (Roberts 68 
et al., 2013). Weng and Yang (2015) found that the contributing factors in shipping accident 69 
mortalities resulting from fire/explosion accidents are, on average, 132% higher than from 70 
accidents where no fire/explosions were involved. According to the report presented by 71 
Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty (2016), about 10% of total losses, between 2006 and 72 
2015, were caused by fire and explosion. From 2007 to 2016, foundering accounts for the 73 
highest percentage of losses (50.42%), followed by wrecked/stranded with 20.57% with the 74 
third highest contributor fire/explosion (9.95%) (Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty, 75 
2017). The MIRG project (2017) stated that from 2000 to 2015, among different types of 76 
marine vessels in European waters, the largest percentage of ship fires and explosions 77 




































































 The actual number of fire and explosion accidents could be much higher than the 79 
published statistics because of underreporting issues of maritime accidents (Hassel et al., 80 
2011; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011). It is often found that the number of fatalities from fire 81 
and explosion accidents in shipping is comparatively higher than that of other types of 82 
accidents. Fire and explosion usually occur unexpectedly which provides little evacuation 83 
time for passengers or crew members (National Research Council, 1991).  84 
 This shows that the risk of fire and explosion in shipping vessels is high. The 85 
consequence of ship fire and explosion depends on the presence and amount of hazardous 86 
materials and the employed preventive and control mechanisms. In the absence of appropriate 87 
protection and response, even a small error that leads to a fire and explosion event has 88 
potential to cause loss of vessels, environmental pollution, injuries, and deaths due to the 89 
instantaneous nature of ship fires  (Shichuan et al., 2012).  90 
 Uğurlu (2016) investigated fire and explosion events that occurred between 1999 and 91 
2013 in tankers transporting hazardous liquid cargoes and identified 13 root causes and five 92 
causal factors being violation of entry permit (VEP), violation of work permit (VWP), lack of 93 
risk analysis (LRA), deficiency in safety management system (DSMS), and deficiency in 94 
planned maintenance system (DPMS). This study was conducted in three stages. In the first 95 
stage, significance level of the root causes was determined using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 96 
in the second stage, the causative factors underlying the root causes were determined and in 97 
the final stage, the relationship between the causative factors and root causes was determined. 98 
The author argued that hot work, electric arcs, static electricity, and combustible gas 99 
accumulation are the most significant root causes of fire and explosion accidents in tankers 100 
transporting hazardous liquid cargoes and VWP and LRA are the main causative factors of 101 




































































In this paper, the contributing factors for fire and explosion accidents in maritime 103 
transportation are reviewed based on published full investigation reports and literatures. 104 
Accident investigation reports prepared by different agencies such as National Transport 105 
Safety Board (NTSB), Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board (DMAIB), Australian 106 
Transport Safety Board (ATSB), Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU), 107 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 108 
and Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) are considered.  Publicly available fire 109 
and explosion related accidents in maritime transportation between 1990 and 2015 are 110 
grouped into five categories according to their main causes, namely human error, mechanical 111 
failure, reaction, electrical fault and unknown. The percentage of fire and explosion accidents 112 
caused by each causal factor is given in Figure 1. 113 
 114 
Figure 1. Percentages of fire and explosion accidents 115 
These accidents are further divided into different categories in order to compare the 116 
number of fatalities and number of accidents in maritime transportation as shown in Figure 2. 117 















































































technological progress. In order to avoid fire and explosion accidents, a comprehensive 119 
review of all contributing factors is essential. 120 
 121 
Figure 2. Number of fatalities, and number of fire and explosion accidents during 1991-2015 122 
 Additionally, in this study, potential preventative or mitigation measures are discussed 123 
for each type of contributing factor. Identifying sources of flammable materials and replacing 124 
them with less hazardous materials may play a positive role in mitigating fire and explosion 125 
risks in ship. Marine fuels are highly flammable. In this study, it is found that 31% fire and 126 
explosion events are caused by accidental releases of fuel or lubricating oil in the engine 127 
room. Due to this, it is worthwhile to review from a safety perspective flammability 128 
properties of alternative fuels. The effectiveness of alternative fuels in mitigating fire and 129 
explosion hazards is reviewed based on the comparison of their flammability properties. 130 
Therefore, this study would help identify contributing factors for fire and explosion events in 131 
maritime transportation and would seek to highlight potential preventive measures. 132 
2. Fire and explosion accidents causations 133 
 The causes of fire and explosion in marine operations identified by Kwiecińska 134 
(2015), provided characteristics of basic fire causes and the influencing factors in ships. 135 
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causes, contributing factors that were responsible for past fire and explosion accidents in 143 
shipping are considered. This can provide different real scenarios of fire and explosion events 144 
and help identify real causes and their potential mitigation approaches. An overview of steps 145 
undertaken in this study is given in Figure 3. This shows that the four causal factors and 146 
Figure 3. Steps undertaken in this study 
 
 HE modelling 
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 Use of automatic 
monitoring and 
fault diagnosis 
 Use of arc-
resistant 
switchboard 
Effectiveness and prospect of alternative fuels in controlling fire and 
explosion hazards are qualitatively discussed 




































 Heat generation 
 Corrosion 
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Fire and explosion accidents in maritime 




































































several underlying causes of fire and explosion accidents are identified using past accidents 147 
information and that general preventative measures are proposed qualitatively. 148 
2.1. Human error as a cause of fire and explosion accidents 149 
 The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) (2003) report stated that marine accidents 150 
directly associated with human errors in the MAIB, the ATSB, and the TSB reports total 82%, 151 
85%, and 84%, respectively. This confirms that there is a consistency of causal factor 152 
findings among the data and reports in Australian, Canadian, and UK transport accident 153 
investigation authorities. This outcome has been supported by other studies (Baker and 154 
McCafferty, 2005; Rothblum, 2000; Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987). For instance, human 155 
error is involved in 75-96% of marine causalities (Rothblum, 2000). A study by Wagenaar 156 
and Groeneweg (1987) showed human error contributed to a total of 96 out of 100 marine 157 
accidents. Similar results were reported in Baker and McCafferty (2005) where within the 158 
period 1991-2001, 80-85% of the maritime accidents were due to human error, 50% were 159 
initiated by human error and 30% associated with human error.       160 
 Apostol-Mates and Barbu (2016), stated that human error is related to technology, 161 
environment, organisation, work practice and group. The Nippon Kaiji Kyokai - a 162 
classification society, (ClassNK, 2010) broadly divided the factors related to the occurrence 163 
of human error into human element, hardware factors, and organisation and management 164 
factors. Baker and McCafferty (2005) categorised them into five broad groups including 165 
situation awareness group, management group, risk group, maintenance human errors and 166 
non-human error group and argued that failure of situation awareness and assessment, 167 
resulting from human fatigue and task omission, is predominant. Whittingham (2004) 168 
postulated two types of human error causation namely internal causes leading to endogenous 169 
error and external causes leading to exogenous error. An endogenous error relates to an 170 




































































exogenous error has an external cause such as an unsuitable working environment. Reason 172 
(2000) discussed human fallibility using two approaches: the person and the system 173 
approaches. The person approach is related to errors of individuals, blaming workers for 174 
unsafe acts such negligence, forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness. The system 175 
approach focuses on the existing errors in the workplace and the organisational processes. 176 
Based on this concept, human failure is grouped into two categories namely active failures 177 
and latent failures. The active failures are the unsafe acts committed by frontline people such 178 
as drivers, control room staff or machine operators. The unsafe acts include a variety of 179 
practices such as slip ups, lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and procedural violations. The latent 180 
failures arise from decisions made by designers, builders, procedure writers, and top level 181 
management. Examples of latent failures are poor design of plant and equipment, ineffective 182 
training, inadequate supervision, ineffective communications, and uncertainties in roles and 183 
responsibilities. Latent failures often remain dormant within the system before they combine 184 
with active failures and local triggers to create an accident scenario. These failures can be 185 
identified and remedied before an adverse event occurs using proactive risk management 186 
strategy (Reason, 2000). 187 
 Rothblum (2000) stated that the maritime system is a people system where people 188 
interact with technology, environment, and organizational factors. Humans may not be the 189 
sole cause of an accident and in most accidents are involved in a complex interaction of 190 
several factors such as software, hardware, environmental conditions and other humans 191 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 1997). Human interaction with other key factors is shown in 192 
Figure 4. This shows that human factor depends on individual factors such as competency, 193 
health, stress and strength, workplace environment (such as site design, ease of use and 194 
working condition) and management (procedures, supervision and communications) under 195 





































































Figure 4. Human interaction with other factors (WORKSAFE BC, 2017) 198 
In order to identify underlying causes of human failures, generic human error was 199 
functionally deconstructed into logical, mutually exclusive categories into skill based, rule 200 
based, and knowledge based errors, routine violations and singular violation as shown in 201 
Figure 5. 202 
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 203 
Figure 5. Behavioural deconstruction of human error (Harrald et al., 1998). 204 
 Celik and Cebi (2009) identified various contributing factors of human errors in 205 
shipping accidents as given in Table 1 and priority weights were generated considering 4 206 
levels of an analytical Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The 207 
study argued that skill-based errors, and personnel related factors such as coordination, 208 
communication, and planning are the primary causes of shipping accidents in first and second 209 
levels respectively. Moreover, inadequate supervision and failure to correct problems, and 210 
inadequate organizational processes are the root causes of shipping accidents in third and 211 
fourth levels of HFACS. 212 
Table 1. Contributing factors of human error on shipping accident 213 





Unsafe act or “human error” 
 
Unintended action Intended action 
























































































































c. Cognitive factors 
d. Psycho behavioural 
factors 
 
2. Individuals condition 
a. Adverse 
physiological states 
b. Physical mental 
limitations 
c. Perceptual factors 
 
























Among several causes of human error, deficient maintenance is one of the major 214 
causes of fire and explosion (Okoh and Haugen, 2014). This includes inadequate hazard 215 
analysis, violation of hot work and confined space entry permit guidelines. Some major 216 
accidents include an explosion and fire on the tanker Petrolab (TSB, 1999), boiler explosions 217 
on the bulk carrier Shirane (ATSB, 2007a) and cargo hold fire on BBC Baltic (ATSB, 2012a). 218 
Dhillon and Liu (2006) reviewed human error in maintenance and concluded that human 219 
error in maintenance was a pressing problem. Chang and Lin (2006) reviewed 242 accidents 220 
that occurred between 1960-2003 in storage tanks and revealed that fire and explosion 221 




































































including poor operation and maintenance. Okoh and Haugen (2013) stated that about 30–40% 223 
of all accidents and precursor events in the chemical processing industry are due to 224 
maintenance-related factors. In another study conducted by Okoh and Haugen (2014) 225 
revealed that among 80 maintenance related major accidents, explosion was involved in 44% 226 
of these accidents followed by fire (34%). Hemmatian et al. (2014) also revealed that human 227 
error occurred mostly in general maintenance activities. In the current study, maintenance 228 
related errors were observed in 43% of human error accidents. The fire and explosion on the 229 
chemical tanker Bow Mariner in the Atlantic Ocean can be considered as an example of a 230 
major accident due to human error in a maintenance related activity. The accident occurred 231 
during the cleaning of residual Methyl Tert Butyl Ether (MTBE) by the crew. The accident 232 
caused 21 losses of life and the release of a large amount of MTBE, Ethyl Alcohol, heavy 233 
fuel oil and diesel into the environment (Manuel, 2011). Use of unskilled crew and lack of 234 
situation awareness was reported to be the cause of the accident (US Coast Guard, 2004). 235 
Another accident was the explosion of the Tanker Qian Chi in 2011 that led to the serious 236 
injury of three crew and caused severe damage to equipment (ATSB, 2012b). The improper 237 
installation of the thermal oil heater burner nozzle was reported to be the cause of this 238 
accident. Consequently, the fuel found its way to the burner and accumulated before the start 239 
of ignition. The furnace exploded when the igniter started. The IIWG report (Maritime Safety 240 
Committee 81
st
 session, 2006) stated that the majority of incidents involved MARPOL Annex 241 
II substances (rather than oil) and were caused by tank cleaning, venting or gas freeing. Celik 242 
and Cebi (2009) HFACS investigated human errors in shipping accidents and argued that 243 
disorganisation in maintenance planning and management processes are significant factors in 244 
contributing to human error. Okoh and Haugen (2014) discussed failure scenarios associated 245 
with maintenance activities and argued that lack of barrier maintenance, deficient design, 246 




































































the most frequent causes in terms of the active accident process, the latent accident process 248 
and the work process respectively. Deficient maintenance work also introduces new hazards 249 
particularly in safety-critical maintenance works and these are generated by application of 250 
new, invalidated procedures, processes, conditions and equipment or existing under validated 251 
ones. For example, an explosion and fire occurred in the Partridge-Raleigh oilfield in 2006 252 
during welding of an open-ended piping left unisolated after a previous maintenance session 253 
(US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2007). 254 
Another factor responsible for human error is environmental conditions. Substandard 255 
physical working conditions may deter the effective performance of duties, causing stress and 256 
fatigue. One example of poor working conditions includes physical exhaustion due to high 257 
temperatures. High sea states, vibration, noises, and unsuitable temperature can also affect 258 
one’s ability to work and can cause stress and fatigue. The environment refers not only to 259 
weather and other aspects of the physical work environment, but also the regulatory and 260 
economic climates (Rothblum, 2000).  Moreover, tight economic conditions may increase the 261 
probability of risk-taking and may put enormous pressure on one’s working conditions. 262 
Ambient environmental considerations also include appropriate design of living spaces that 263 
assist in recovery from fatigue. 264 
Every human error may lead to a condition necessary for an accident to occur which 265 
means that if there is no human error, a chain of events may break and the accident may not 266 
transpire. Hence, by employing appropriate means of preventing some human errors or 267 
increasing their detection probability in marine applications, one may provide a higher level 268 
of marine safety with fewer number of casualties (Rothblum, 2000). 269 
2.2. Mechanical failure as a cause of fire and explosion accidents 270 
 Fire and explosion accidents initiated by mechanical failures have resulted in 271 




































































Specialty (2017) report, mechanical failure was the fifth highest reason for ship losses from 273 
2007 to 2016. Darbra and Casal (2004) revealed that mechanical failure is the second highest 274 
grounds for general accidents followed by impacts. Vilchez et al. (1995) revealed that 275 
mechanical failures contributed 33% of accidents in a survey of 5325 accidents involving 276 
hazardous materials. The VVT research (Hakkarainen et al., 2009), found that fire and 277 
explosion events occurring in machinery spaces, cargo spaces and accommodation spaces of 278 
ships are 79%, 16% and 11% respectively. The influencing factors for mechanical failures 279 
(damage to mechanical equipment) are improperly selected material or its aging, extreme 280 
conditions of device operation, lack or malfunction of safety devices, bad quality of prepared 281 
safety mechanisms, connections or materials, spill of fuel or working fluids, and human error 282 
(improper use of tools or machines, negligence of maintenance work, and noncompliance 283 
with safety rules) (Bejger and Drzewieniecki, 2015).  Similarly, Maleque and Salit (2013a) 284 
outlined that common causes of mechanical failure in a component or system are misuse, 285 
assembly errors, manufacturing defects, improper or inadequate maintenance, design 286 
errors/deficiencies, improper material or poor selection of materials, improper heat treatments, 287 
unforeseen operating conditions, inadequate quality assurance, inadequate environmental 288 
protection/control and casting discontinuities.  289 
It is crucial to investigate the most vulnerable areas of any vessel or ship for 290 
mechanical failures. Studies of shipping accidents have shown that in most cases the fire 291 
originated in the engine room and was caused by oil or fuel coming into contact with hot 292 
exhausts. According to a research conducted by  Det Norske Veritas (DNV) of 165 fires on 293 
board the DNV fleet from 1992 to 1997,  63% of fires occurred in the engine room and 56% 294 
of all engine room fires were caused by the combination of oil leakage onto a hot surface 295 
(Det Norske Veritas, 2000). Paula et al. (1998) presented the analysis of events involving fire 296 




































































Services Limited (LMIS) and found that the majority of fires or explosions are triggered by 298 
mechanical failures due to release of fuel oil and/or lube oil system onto hot surfaces in the 299 
engine room. This shows that spraying of fuel oil or lube oil on hot surfaces is one of the 300 
major causes of fire on board ships. The sources of oil or fuel leakage include damaged 301 
flexible hoses, couplings, piston ring, filters and fractured pipes (Det Norske Veritas, 2000). 302 
In several past shipping accidents, various factors have caused mechanical failures 303 
and resulted in fires and/or explosions (ATSB, 2010; MAIB, 2007); NTSB (2013). For 304 
instance, on 10
th
 March 2012, a roll on/roll off vehicle carrier, Alliance Norfolk, encountered 305 
rough weather resulting in damaged cargo and subsequent fire. The NTSB (2013) determined 306 
the probable cause of the fire to be due to ignition of flammable material by an undetermined 307 
ignition source due to shifting cargo while the vessel was rolling in heavy seas after losing 308 
power.  309 
Another factor responsible for mechanical failure is that of an unsafe act such as 310 
failure to use the correct tool and procedure, negligence and inadequate supervision. For 311 
example on 10
th
 December 2009, the containership Maersk Duffield in Moreton Bay, 312 
Queensland, Australia caught fire in an engine room. The ATSB investigation (ATSB, 2010) 313 
found that one or more of the connecting rod palm nuts or counterweight nuts had not been 314 
tightened sufficiently during recent overhauls and that the resultant failure of one of the 315 
retaining studs was the initiator of the catastrophic engine failure. Similarly, a fire broke out 316 
in the auxiliary engine room on board the containership Gunde Maersk on 8
th
 December 2015. 317 
The NTSB (2015) determined that the fire was caused by fuel leaking from a dislodged O-318 
ring in the fuel supply line and spraying onto the exhaust side of the engine. The leak 319 
occurred because the fitting had not been tightened with a torque wrench as prescribed in the 320 
manufacturer’s written procedures. Likewise, on 13
th
 of July 2014, the bulk carrier Marigold 321 




































































(2016a) determined that the fire began on one of the generators after one of its fuel oil pipe 323 
fittings failed, resulting in sprays of fuel oil onto a hot surface on the generator. The 324 
investigation found that the compression fitting that failed had been used to connect a 325 
replacement pressure gauge that had a different pipe connection fitting size to that of the 326 
original pressure gauge. It is evident that human factor is one of the major contributing 327 
factors for mechanical failures that lead to fire and explosion in marine vessels. 328 
Use of damaged filter or mechanical seals has been seen as another contributing factor 329 
for mechanical failure. For instance, on 19
th
 of March 1999, the Multitank Ascania caught 330 
fire due to thermal oil leaking from a thermal oil pump mechanical seal and/or a nearby 331 
flange joint onto a pressure relief valve (MAIB, 2000). Similarly, on 11
th
 March 1993, the oil 332 
tanker Irving Nordic experienced a main engine crankcase explosion due to piston ring 333 
failure contributed to by substantial wear on the cylinder liners and the ignition of lubricating 334 
oil (TSB, 1995). 335 
Several mechanical failures occurred due to inadequate maintenances such as failure 336 
to follow procedure, inadequate inspection and deficient risk assessment during maintenance. 337 
For example, on 3
rd
 February 1995, the Norwegian flagged containership Team Heina caught 338 
fire in the engine room due to a spray of hot fuel oil, from a failed compression fitting, onto 339 
the fuel rail of the starboard generator engine which was then ignited by the hot exhaust 340 
manifold (ATSB, 1995). The ATSB investigation found that the compression fitting failed 341 
due to prolonged fretting of the pipe caused by misalignment of the pipe with the fitting and 342 
also engine vibration. Similarly, on 9
th 
of February 2007, the Bahamas registered general 343 
cargo ship Baltimar Boreas, whilst off Newcastle, New South Wales, caught fire in the 344 
engine room due to diesel oil spraying from a failed flexible fuel hose onto the very hot 345 
surface of the generator’s engine (ATSB, 2008). The investigation found that some hoses 346 




































































management system provided no guidance for the maintenance or routine replacement of the 348 
flexible hoses. On 24
th
 August 1998, the containership Repulse Bay caught fire in the engine 349 
room. The fire was caused by ignition of oil leaked from fractured bolts of the exhaust valve 350 
actuator (MAIB, 1999). The bolts fractured due to cyclic loads and fatigue and investigation 351 
found that there were no engine manufacturer’s guidelines for maintenance or inspection. 352 
Beside these aforementioned factors, there are other factors responsible for 353 
mechanical failures including malfunction of automatic controllers, failure of components in 354 
safety system and use of defective components. For example, on 2
nd
 of October 2006, failure 355 
of the boiler’s automatic controller overheated the auxiliary boiler furnace tube, causing a fire 356 
to break out on-board the containership Maersk Doha (MAIB, 2007). As a result, the 357 
auxiliary boiler fire tube, exhaust gas economiser tubes, uptakes and funnel casing were 358 
damaged due to direct, or radiant effect of excessive heat (Celik et al., 2010).   359 
On marine vessels and offshore structures, corrosion is a leading factor for 360 
mechanical failures due to environmental conditions. Corrosion causes material degradation 361 
resulting in loss of mechanical properties such as strength and ductility and ultimately causes 362 
failure (Popoola et al., 2013). According to HID Statistics Report (HSR) (2003), about 66.3% 363 
of hydrocarbon releases were caused by equipment faults during the reported period and the 364 
most common cause was ‘mechanical failure’ which, in the majority of cases, was attributed 365 
to corrosion or other related degradation. 366 
According to the causes of accidents, it is evident that mechanical failure may not be a 367 
standalone cause of a fire and or explosion in a marine vessel, rather it is associated with 368 
other contributing factors such as human error, harsh operating and environmental conditions, 369 




































































2.3. Thermal reaction as a cause of fire and explosion accidents 371 
In the shipping industry, reaction or auto-ignition of loaded Hazardous and Noxious 372 
Substances (HNS) is a contributing factor for some fire and explosion accidents. According 373 
to Munich Re Group (2002) report, container vessels can sometimes carry as much as 10-40% 374 
volume of hazardous goods. Violent reactions may occur when incompatible chemicals are 375 
mixed (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), 2002). Chemical 376 
accidents originating from improper storage make up almost 25% of all chemical accidents 377 
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2002). 378 
In order to avoid potential hazards while mixing or storing chemicals, the guidelines 379 
mostly used are from US Environmental Protection Agency’s Chemical Compatibility Chart 380 
(Hatayama et al., 1980), U.S. Coast Guard’s Cargo Compatibility Chart and Chemical 381 
Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) (US Coast Guard, 1980)  and National 382 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (Simmons et al., 383 
2008). Shippers of dangerous goods on board ship are required to pack and mark the goods in 384 
accordance with the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code (Ozcayir, 2007) 385 
and to provide necessary shipping documents and declaration that the dangerous goods are in 386 
all respects in proper condition for carriage (ATSB, 2007b). 387 
Despite these guidelines and application of codes, fire and explosion has been 388 
reported while shipping dangerous and noxious goods due to chemical reactions or auto-389 
ignition of goods (BSU, 2014; Sam, 2012; Schröder and Prause, 2016). Dangerous and 390 
noxious goods on board a ship increase the likelihood and consequences of fire and explosion 391 
accidents (Schuda, 1991). This has been supported by some major fire and explosion 392 
accidents involving goods carried on board container ships globally (ATSB, 2007b; Ellis, 393 
2011; Haveman and Shatz, 2006). For instance, on 21
st
 March 2006, an explosion and fire on 394 




































































the vessel and it resulted in total constructive loss (Ellis, 2011; Sam, 2012). It is suspected 396 
and alleged that natural ignition of dangerous goods such as calcium hypochlorite or 397 
fireworks may have caused the initial explosions due to ambient temperatures and improper 398 
stowage (ATSB, 2007b; Ellis, 2011). Similarly, on 11
th
 November 2002, the container ship 399 
Hanjin Pennsylvania, suffered a fire and explosion in the Indian Ocean with the loss of two 400 
lives. This was caused by undeclared dangerous goods, magnesium (Ellis, 2010). These 401 
incidents indicate the consequences of undeclared goods in shipping. 402 
The main contributing factors for reaction or auto-ignition of loaded goods are 403 
defective packaging and incorrect stowage. The root causes of these are difficulty in chemical 404 
hazard identification and human error because of the complex nature of chemistry and the 405 
multitude of chemical regulations and their organisations relevant to their packing, storage 406 
and shipping (Simmons et al., 2009). Some chemicals such as methyl ethyl ketone peroxide 407 
(MEKP) are unstable and extremely flammable at ambient conditions. They readily cause fire 408 
and explosions if they are neither stored nor handled appropriately (2008a; 2008b). On 7
th
 409 
July 2010, a container ship, Charlotte Maersk, caught fire while en route from Port Klang, 410 
Malaysia bound for Salalah, Oman. Based on circumstantial evidence, the DMAIB (2012) 411 
pointed out that the fire probably originated from the container containing methyl ethyl 412 
ketone peroxide (MEKP).  413 
Some chemicals such as calcium hypochlorite are prone to thermal runaway, a 414 
phenomenon in which the heat naturally produced by the chemical serves to heat itself further, 415 
thus generating more heat (Barton and Nolan, 1989; Clancey, 1987). According to the United 416 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruling for the M/V DG Harmony explosion 417 
(2008c), on 9
th
 November 1998, the ship was carrying approximately 160,000 kilograms of 418 
calcium hypochlorite below deck when an explosion occurred in the area where the calcium 419 




































































October 1997, while the ship was carrying 512 drums of calcium hypochlorite (Tamburello, 421 
2011). The explosion was caused by the self-heating of calcium hypochlorite contained in the 422 
area of the explosion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2006) 423 
acknowledged that temperatures in the cargo area were high enough for the calcium 424 
hypochlorite to spontaneously ignite and recognised it as the cause of the explosion. 425 
Additionally, defective packaging, such as loose lids on steel drums and loosely tied 426 
or damaged bulky bags can expose HNS goods to hazardous conditions and transporting 427 
them in large packages, such as bulky bags, increases the risk of auto-ignition and 428 
flammability (National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS), 429 
1995). Defective packaging and incorrect stowage are directly related to human and 430 
organisational errors. For example, on 14
th
 July 2012, the German-flagged full container ship 431 
MSC Flaminia caught fire and exploded. The BSU (2014) stated, after analysing the physical 432 
and chemical properties of all the items of cargo in cargo hatch 4 of the damaged container, 433 
the most likely cause of the fire was either a release of car care products or leakage of 434 
dimethylaminoethanol from a tank container, which in turn reacted with surrounding items of 435 
cargo generating heat and ignition. In February 2007, the Nitrogen, Phosphorous and 436 
Potassium (NPK) fertilizer aboard the cargo ship Ostedijk underwent a chemical reaction and 437 
destroyed part of the cargo and compromised the ship (Babrauskas, 2003). This chemical is 438 
known to undergo self-sustaining decomposition reactions upon exposure to a heat source 439 
(Babrauskas, 2003).  440 
Past shipping accidents confirm that the root causes of chemical reactions that lead to 441 
fire and explosion are mainly thermal runaway, auto-ignition and leakage due to defective 442 
packaging and incorrect stowage preceded by human and organisational errors, and 443 
inadequate safety analysis. This indicates that despite availability of regulatory requirements, 444 




































































still a major contributing factor to accidents in shipping. This demands a need for detailed 446 
study of properties of chemicals and the precautions that should be taken to avoid devastating 447 
losses. 448 
2.4. Electric fault as a cause of fire and explosion accidents 449 
Faults in electrical systems can be classified into a few groups such as poor electrical 450 
connections, short or open circuits, overloads, load imbalance and improper equipment 451 
installation (Jadin and Taib, 2012). Most commonly, an electrical fault on a ship causes three 452 
types of incident, being electrical shock, electrical fires and electrical failures. Electrical fire 453 
is a serious hazard aboard any ship and is most likely caused by faulty or improperly 454 
maintained electrical equipment. Electrical faults or malfunctions have resulted in several 455 
residential, industrial and shipping accidents in the past (Ahrens, 2016; ATSB, 2016b; 456 
Campbell, 2016). The National Fire Protection Association research report (Campbell, 2017) 457 
described electrical fires based on type of device that failed, type of malfunctions, location 458 
and origin, and time of occurrence. This report shows that electrical distribution, lighting and 459 
power transfer contributed to 57% of reported home fires involving electrical failure or 460 
malfunction. Babrauskas (2008) described electrical fires by grouping them into two 461 
categories, namely (1) according to the nature of the physical mechanism that led to ignition, 462 
and (2) according to causative factors which caused the failure mechanism to be triggered. 463 
Babrauskas (2008) stated that physical mechanisms causing electrical fires are poor 464 
connections, arcing across a carbonised path, arcing in air, excessive thermal insulation, 465 
overload, ejection of hot particles, dielectric breakdown in solid or liquid insulators and 466 
miscellaneous phenomena. The US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) study 467 
(1990) outlined the causative factors for electrical fire as improper altercations, improper 468 
initial installation, deterioration due to aging, improper use, inadequate capacity, faulty 469 




































































reported residential electrical distribution system fires. Fires on ships are caused by electrical 471 
faults, ignition of spilled oils and fuels (Mouritz and Mathys, 1999). A research project on 472 
165 fires on board the DNV fleet from 1992 to 1997 found that 9% of fires originated from 473 
electrical components (Det Norske Veritas, 2000).   474 
Electrical faults or malfunctions have caused a number of fire accidents on marine 475 
vessels. For instance, on December 11
th
, 2015 a fire broke out in the electrical control room 476 
aboard the freighter Alpena 2015 and resulted in damage costs of 4 million dollars (Stuards, 477 
2015). The NTSB (2016) determined that the probable cause of the fire was a fault in the 478 
electrical wiring providing power to the aft anchor winch. 479 
In some fire and explosion accidents that occurred on shipping vessels, investigations 480 
could not conclusively find actual causes of accidents and thus, only provided likely or 481 
possible causes based on circumstances. For instance, on 28
th
 April 1990, Val Rosandra was 482 
discharging refrigerated propylene at Brindisi in Italy when a violent explosion occurred in 483 
the cargo compressor motor room with a consequent fire due to ignition of escaping 484 
propylene. It is believed that the explosion most likely occurred because of ignition of 485 
released gas with electrical equipment in the compressor motor room (Niall and Roger, 2002). 486 
Similarly, on 7
th
 August 1997, a fire was discovered on the lower bridge deck of the 487 
Taiwanese flag bulk carrier Ming Mercy. Based on circumstantial evidence such as the 488 
remainder of amateur wiring extensions found in the location of fire and other 489 
accommodation spaces, the source of the fire was identified as electrical fault (Marine 490 
Incident Investigation Unit, 1997). 491 
On 9
th
 of October 2014, a fire started in crew cabin 4 located on the upper deck of 492 
Ocean Drover’s accommodation block. The investigations (ATSB, 2016b) could not identify 493 
the exact origin or cause of the fire because of loss of physical evidence. However, it was 494 






































































 May 2013, heat and smoke were detected on the Swedish-flagged con-ro carrier Atlantic 496 
Cartier and the fire spread rapidly, resulting in cargo and material damages, i.e. cable routing 497 
beneath the ceiling and deck deformation (BSU, 2015). Due to preceding extinguishing 498 
works, smoke build up and the prolonged period of the fire, traces of evidences about the 499 
causes of the fire that might had been presented originally, were covered or destroyed, thus 500 
precise causes could not be identified. Based on circumstantial evidence, the BSU Report 501 
99/13 stated that there were a number of conceivable causes, including a technical fault in the 502 
electrical system of a vehicle due to an overload or short circuit and partial overheating. 503 
Additional possible conceivable causes included negligent or malicious arson, inadequate 504 
wiring revealed by cable loops protruding from the protective sheath, traces of corrosion on 505 
cables, cable connections of inconsistent strength, existing damage to cables due to welding 506 
operations, damage due to abrasion caused by metal cables, forcibly bent cables inside the 507 
insulation, damage to the insulation due to overheating and traces of several earlier fires on 508 
deck 3 B. 509 
Investigation of fire accidents can be complex and not as clear cut as other forms of 510 
investigation (Beland, 1984a; Hine, 2004). This is due to the possibility of omission of traces 511 
of evidence because of extinguishing works, smoke build-up, prolonged burning or fire 512 
damage, and the complex nature of fire scenarios. Beland (1984b) claimed that electricity is 513 
not as fire prone as generally believed and concluded that electrical fires are conceivable 514 
when different abuses such as overloading, combustible materials, high ambient temperatures 515 
and inadequate insulation are present. Due to the complexity involved in the justification of 516 
actual causes of fire or lack of precise physical evidence, a significant number of fires were 517 
mis-investigated and were assigned as electrical fires (Babrauskas, 2001; Beland, 1984b; 518 
Béland, 1992). Beland (1984b) further argued that electricity is a handy scapegoat because it 519 




































































unconvincing evidence that electrical equipment was close to the point of origin. This later 521 
claim is not ruled out if the investigation reports of Atlantic Cartier fire, Ocean Drover fire 522 
and Val Rosandra fire and explosion accidents are referred to because their concluding 523 
remarks about cause of fire were all based on circumstantial evidence. 524 
Despite such claims, there exists much evidence clearly justifying that electricity has 525 
contributed to fire and explosion accidents causing catastrophic consequences in residential, 526 
industrial and commercial spaces (Babrauskas, 2001; Campbell, 2016; Daeid, 2004; 527 
Troitzsch, 2016). This signifies a need for systematic research and investigation approaches 528 
in regard to causes of fires and explosions in order to improve accident investigations and to 529 
reduce fire and explosion accident losses.  530 
In this study, it is found that about 9% fire and explosion accidents have unknown 531 
causes or definite contributing factors, and their underlying causes were not identified during 532 
investigation. Most physical evidence leading to fire and explosion is often damaged and 533 
destroyed during the accident (Beland, 1984a; Hine, 2004). This shows that investigation of 534 
fire and explosion accidents requires special attention and may need more effective 535 
approaches.   536 
3. Preventative measures of fire and explosion accidents 537 
The causal factors of fire and explosion accidents can be avoided or mitigated by 538 
adopting preventative measures. In order to prevent or mitigate the causes, identification of 539 
potential preventative measures is important. However, there is no silver bullet to identify 540 
solutions to all contributing factors. Due to this, some potential preventative measures are 541 
given in generic ways for each contributing factor. 542 
3.1. Prevention and mitigation of human error 543 
Humans are generally seen as error-prone as proved by numerous examples of human 544 




































































performance with technology, specifically by automation, which is considered highly reliable 546 
because it is the result of a formal design process and is based on components with known 547 
failure rates (Hollnagel, 2008). Moreover, employing human centred approach may be 548 
effective to mitigate human error because it puts the human user at the centre of the design as 549 
shown in Figure 6 (Midland Engineering, 2017). 550 
 551 
Figure 6. Human centred approach for mitigating human error (Midland Engineering, 2017) 552 
In marine operations, human errors that lead to fire and or explosion generally occur 553 
in maintenance activities. In this study, it is found that 43% of human error results from 554 
maintenance related activities such as hot work, overhauls and inspections. Maintenance has 555 
been a subject of major interest in order to avoid or reduce human error. Pennie et al. (2007) 556 
introduced the issue of maintenance error considering the human factor in maritime 557 
maintenance and inspection and with emphasis on design for maintainability. Islam et al. 558 
















































































and argued that the checking of fuel and lubricating oil filter pressure difference activity have 560 
high probability for accidents. 561 
For human error likelihood assessments, different approaches such as the Human 562 
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), the Technique for Human Error Rate 563 
Prediction (THERP) and the Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) are used (Abbassi et 564 
al., 2015; Noroozi et al., 2010). Islam et al. (2017) developed a monograph for assessing the 565 
likelihood of human error in marine operations and argued that the monograph can 566 
significantly decrease the time and resources required to estimate Human Error Probability 567 
(HEP) when decision making for marine operations involving different environmental and 568 
operational conditions. Applications of these methodologies can be helpful tools to reduce the 569 
potential of accident occurrence by assessing HEP. 570 
Human error modelling (HEM) and an adoption of ‘open culture’ or confidential 571 
reporting system (CRS) are essential to better understand the causes and effects of human 572 
error (Whittingham, 2004). The HEM helps to explore the relationship between task and error, 573 
and helps to better understand the role of human error in accident sequences. Adoption of 574 
open culture encourages employees to report errors that they have made, or seen, so that the 575 
underlying causes can be investigated and corrected on time. A CRS enables error or other 576 
safety issues to be reported confidentially (without fear of litigation) by an employee to a 577 
concerned authority and the authority then communicates the information to the employer for 578 
necessary action (O'Leary and Chappell, 1996). 579 
In most cases, human errors are caused by the growing imbalance between system 580 
reliability and human reliability. In order to overcome this imbalance, the science of 581 
ergonomics has evolved which focuses on addressing how the design of the interface between 582 
human and machine could take more account of human capabilities and maximize human 583 




































































to prevent human actions becoming out-of-tolerance in terms of exceeding some limit of 585 
acceptability for a desired system function (Whittingham, 2004). 586 
According to Karwowski (2005), the current focus of the human factors and 587 
ergonomics (HFE) discipline is on the design  and management of systems  that satisfy 588 
human compatibility requirements. The design integration refers to interactions between 589 
hardware (computer-based technology), organization (organizational structure), information 590 
system and people (human skills, training and expertise). Systems’ management maintains 591 
the interactions between various systems’ elements across process and product quality, 592 
workplace and work system design, occupational safety and health programmes and 593 
corporate environmental protection policies. The author further emphasised that emerging 594 
branches of HFE such as microergonomics, neuro-ergonomics and nanoergonomics would 595 
play a significant role in mitigating human errors. For instance, neuro-ergonomics focuses on 596 
the neural control and brain manifestations of the perceptual-physical-cognitive-emotional 597 
interrelationships in human work activities (Parasuraman, 2003). This aims to design a 598 
workplace to better match the neural capacities and limitations of human. 599 
The ABS (2014) proposed a Human Factors Engineering/Ergonomics Model which 600 
contains four elements that influence safety and efficiency in job performance. They are 601 
vessel or offshore installation design and layout considerations, workplace ambient 602 
environmental conditions, management and organizational issues related to operations, and 603 
the personnel who operate the vessel or offshore installation as depicted in Figure 7. In order 604 
to maintain safety, productivity and efficiency, sufficient attention needs to be given to these 605 






































































Figure 7. ABS Human Factors Engineering/Ergonomics Model  609 
People is an integral part of organisation and system as discussed in section 2.1. For 610 
prevention of both active and latent human failures, it should be looked at from a system 611 
approach which generally consists of defences, barriers, and safeguards. Maritime 612 
transportation has many defensive layers such as those which are engineered (alarms, 613 
physical barriers, automatic shutdowns, etc), people (control room operators, etc), and 614 
procedures and administrative controls. For prevention of fire and explosion accidents due to 615 
human factor, Swiss cheese model can be used as suggested by Reason (2000). The 616 
developed Swiss cheese model has three safety layers, equipment, processes and people, with 617 
direct influence of organisational safety culture as shown in Figure 8. The presence of holes 618 
(errors, deficiency, flaws) in any one layer does not normally cause an accident. Usually, this 619 
can happen only when the holes in all layers momentarily line up allowing the hazards to pass 620 
through all layers. It is obvious that reducing the number of holes in each slice would play a 621 













































































Equipment should be designed, located and modified in such a way that it contributes 624 
in reduction of errors during use, maintenance, inspection and testing thereby incorporating 625 
the effects of the environment in which they are operated. Workspace should be designed 626 
suitable for high human reliability. As far as possible equipment and its accessories need to 627 
be equipped with fire resistances and protections and flammable fluid inventories should have 628 
adequate leak prevention measures. Second safety barrier is processes which mainly comprise 629 
procedures, fire and explosion risk management, near misses and precursor’s investigations, 630 
safety critical communication, staffing levels and workload. Procedures need to be clear and 631 
practical. Safety critical communications must be clear and unambiguous. Staffing levels and 632 
workloads must not compromise safety. The final barrier is people. Employees need adequate 633 
training and competence along with the correct level of supervision and leadership. 634 
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maintenance procedures, flammable gas monitoring) should be made available. Safety 636 
analysis should include human failures and behavioural safety including human interactions 637 
with other factors. Organisational safety culture needs to be appropriate such that it can play a 638 
central role to organise and co-ordinate safety barriers for prevention of accidents.  639 
3.2. Prevention and mitigation of mechanical failure 640 
 Mechanical failures involve an extremely complex interaction of load, time and 641 
environment (Stephens et al., 2000). The complex nature of metal failures can only be 642 
understood by identifying different types of mechanical failures such as fracture, fatigue, 643 
creep, corrosion and wear (Maleque and Salit, 2013a). Vilchez et al. (1995) identified that 644 
leaking valve, overpressure, metallurgy failure, corrosion, flange coupling failure, hose 645 
failure, overheating, weld failure, leaking gland, relief valve failure, fatigue, overload, brittle 646 
failure, incompatible material use are specific causes of mechanical failure.   647 
The causes of fatigue failure are identified as unintended stresses, misuse, design 648 
deficiencies, incorrect assembly, and deficient testing and inspection techniques (Scutti and 649 
McBrine, 2002). In this study, fatigue failure of a component is observed in 36% of accidents 650 
in mechanical failure category. Failure due to fracture can be prevented by avoiding stress 651 
concentration, reducing the speed of loading, avoiding ductile-brittle transition temperature 652 
and preventing thermal shock (Maleque and Salit, 2013a). The most effective method to 653 
prevent fatigue failure is in design improvement by avoiding sharp surface tears, surface 654 
discontinuities and tensile residual stresses and improving fabrication and fastening 655 
procedures (Maleque and Salit, 2013b). Creep occurs when the metal, under certain loads is 656 
heated normally over 40% of melting temperature of the material (Brnic et al., 2017). An 657 
understanding of behaviour of a material at high temperature with certain load over a period 658 
of time is a useful approach. It helps in evaluating failures of components due to creep 659 




































































unintended stresses and strains and design deficiencies and using adequate coating, defect 661 
detection and testing techniques. 662 
Corrosion is a very widespread problem in all engineering structures, especially those 663 
in harsh chemical environments such as chemical engineering processing equipment and in 664 
salty environments (Dasgupta and Pecht, 1991). Failure, due to corrosion, can be controlled 665 
or minimised by various means, such as correct material selection, galvanic protection, 666 
corrosion inhibitors, adequate corrosion monitoring and inspection and protective coating 667 
(Nalli, 2010). The various environmental conditions usually encountered by anticorrosive 668 
coatings are given in Figure 9. In order to avoid material degradation due to corrosion, 669 
protection of anticorrosive coatings is essential. Anticorrosive coatings used in metals can be 670 
protected using barrier protection, passivation of surface (inhibitive effect) and sacrificial 671 
protection (galvanic effect) (Sørensen et al., 2009). Additionally, adoption of risk based 672 
inspection planning and integrity assessment methods may avoid failures due to material 673 
degradation (Khan and Howard, 2007). 674 
 675 
Figure 9. Various environments encountered by anticorrosive coatings (Sørensen et al., 2009) 676 
It is important to understand the principles of corrosion in order to effectively select 677 
materials and to design, fabricate, and utilize metal structures for the optimum economic life 678 
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of facilities because no particular material is the cure for all types of corrosion (Popoola et al., 679 
2013). To understand the principles of corrosion, modelling of corrosion has been done 680 
considering experimental tests and probabilistic approaches such as Bayesian Networks (BN) 681 
(Bhandari et al., 2017a; Bhandari et al., 2017b). The Energy Institute (2008) proposed 682 
guidance model for improving corrosion management practices in oil and gas production and 683 





































































Figure 10. The basic corrosion management process model (Energy Institute, 2008) 686 
Wear is caused by the removal or displacement of material due to mechanical action 687 
of a contacting solid, liquid or gas. Failure due to wear can be controlled by preventing 688 
removal of material and reduction of dimension with proper material selection and design 689 
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maintenance and overhaul because wear cannot be totally eliminated. Therefore, the causes of 691 
failure of engineering components can be controlled or prevented by appropriate design, 692 
better materials selection, avoiding manufacturing defects and overloading, and adequate 693 
maintenance. 694 
3.3.  Prevention of thermal reaction in shipped goods 695 
The shipping industry is involved with transporting goods ranging from non-696 
hazardous to water reactive, corrosive, toxic and highly flammable. For maintaining safety 697 
during the transportation of hazardous goods, a number of international codes, such as 698 
international maritime dangerous goods code, construction and equipment of ships carrying 699 
dangerous chemicals in bulk (resolution A212 VII), Marine pollution convention, the revised 700 
guidelines of IMCO on hazardous chemical classification and the International Convention 701 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter VII (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) 702 
amendments (2002), are being implemented (Rao and Raghavan, 1996). Goods that are listed 703 
within the codes must be transported according to the provisions which specify requirements 704 
for packing, consignment, and transport operations, including packaging to be used, marking, 705 
labelling, placarding, stowing, segregation, and transport documentation (Ellis, 2010). 706 
Despite these codes and regulations, the shipping industry has experienced many fire and 707 
explosion accidents in the past, mainly because of thermal runaway, auto-ignition and 708 
leakage due to defective packaging and incorrect stowage. 709 
Some chemicals decompose rapidly on heating and under influence of light, and react 710 
violently with incompatible substances or ignition sources (acids, bases, reducing agents and 711 
heavy metals) to cause fire and explosion hazards (Wang et al., 2009). These properties of 712 
chemicals are required to be clearly identified, and more efforts are needed for reactive, self-713 
reactive or incompatible chemicals. For instance, Wang et al. (2009) used a  preliminary 714 




































































Tert-butyl hydroperoxide (TBHP) to understand the safe design and precaution for the 716 
hazards of incompatibility of TBHP. The study found that TBHP solutions with alkaline have 717 
potential thermal instability and the aqueous TBHP can show more severe thermal and self-718 
reactive hazards in the presence of contaminants. Hence, care should be taken in shipping, 719 
handling and storing. Due to this, Wang and Shu (2010) recommended reconsideration of the 720 
classification of thermal hazards of organic peroxide from the viewpoint of a proactive 721 
approach to an intrinsically safer design by incorporating safer process operating conditions, 722 
type and material of storage tanks for transportation, and firefighting via temperature control 723 
and pressure relief systems. 724 
Thermal runaway is another contributing factor for fire and explosion accident. Gustin 725 
(2002) provided the case studies of thermal runaway reactions and stated that the study of 726 
accident case histories can greatly reduce the rate of occurrence of runaway reaction 727 
accidents. Similarly, Ho et al. (1998) analysed 65 incidents of runaway reactions and 728 
emergency relief in Taiwan and classified them into several categories according to their 729 
causes, material involved, equipment types, reaction types and ignition sources. The study 730 
found that heat of reaction was the main cause in initiating thermal or pressure runaway. 731 
Chemicals with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reactivity ratings of 2 732 
and above can be categorized as reactive and can undergo runaway reactions, decompositions, 733 
or self-polymerizations with resulting temperature or pressure increase (Rao and Raghavan, 734 
1996). Hence, these chemicals should be stored or handled appropriately avoiding hazardous 735 
environments. 736 
For safe handling of HNS, containerized cargo handling is gaining popularity. This 737 
has led to the design of various containers suited to hazardous substances. For instance, an 738 
insulated storage system with balanced thermal energy flow (McCormick, 2011) and shipping 739 




































































to mitigate thermal runaway and decomposition hazards of chemicals. Moreover, the 741 
specialised containers may prevent leakage and defective packaging. However, the 742 
container’s contents need to be properly secured and braced. 743 
 Simmons et al. (2009) compared the chemical incident reports of the U.S Department 744 
of Energy (May 2005) and U.S. Chemical Safety Board (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 745 
Investigation Board, 2002) and argued that in both reports about 70% of chemicals involved 746 
in incidents were either not regulated or had NFPA instability rating of “0” or “1”. Moreover, 747 
not all chemicals are rated and the NFPA rating system cannot be used for hazard 748 
identification of unrated chemicals. Likewise, Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation 749 
is not all-inclusive indicating that it does not regulate all chemicals. This indicates a need for 750 
more extensive hazard analysis approaches and more robust regulations.    751 
Undeclared dangerous goods that entered the transport chain as a result of awareness, 752 
lack of regulations, mistakes/omissions during cargo transport booking, and deliberate non-753 
declaration have caused a number of fire and explosion accidents. More extensive incident 754 
and inspection data is required to estimate the rates of undeclared dangerous goods and 755 
develop quantitative frequencies for the model (Ellis, 2010). All stakeholders in the transport 756 
chain, such as manufacturers, shippers, cargo brokers, freight forwarders and freight 757 
consolidators should be more accountable for ensuring that dangerous goods are correctly and 758 
honestly declared (Foster, 2007). Furthermore, appropriate training should be given to crew 759 
and personnel about regulations, precautions and packaging procedures in relation to 760 
handling and transporting dangerous goods. Simmons et al. (2009) proposed that academia, 761 
industry, and government join together and establish training and experience requirements to 762 




































































3.4. Prevention of electrical faults 764 
In marine operations, electrical faults are caused by several factors, as discussed in 765 
section 2.4. Prevention of these causes is essential because a simple fault can be catastrophic 766 
in ships. For instance, a minor electrical spark may be an ignition source for an extreme fire 767 
and explosion event.   Arcing fault is a common cause of electrical fires. Due to high-768 
impedance, currents frequently fall within the range of normal working loads during arcing 769 
faults. Under this condition, circuit breakers frequently become ineffective against arcing 770 
faults (Land III and Fowler, 2009). The use of arc-resistant switchboards and the use of arc-771 
fault detection systems such as automatic arc-fault protection can significantly reduce the risk 772 
to personnel when arcing occurs (Land III, 2008).  773 
The ignition from poor connections (overheating or glowing connections) and 774 
external heating resulting in short circuit or arcing can be prevented by ensuring proper 775 
training to crew and fail-safe design of the system. Physical damage, voltage surges and 776 
deterioration of electrical insulation present hazards which can cause electrical fires and 777 
further research is required for physical mechanisms, minimum values, time frame for 778 
ignition, industrial fires and metallurgical issues relating to electrical fires (Babrauskas, 2008). 779 
Avoiding the use of defective or faulty electrical appliances may prevent short circuit 780 
ignitions. Moreover, very minor incidents such as static electricity, electric spark and arc can 781 
be sufficient to ignite accumulated combustible gas in confined or semi-confined areas and 782 
avoiding their sources will reduce likelihood of fire and explosion events. 783 
 Skjong et al. (2016) stated that characterization of the marine vessel electrical grid 784 
through real-time measurements, and the monitoring of fundamental parameters such as 785 
impedance, harmonic currents and voltages, would be essential to ensure the safety, integrity, 786 




































































the authors proposed that a smart grid similar to the modern land-based electrical system 788 
should be a necessity in marine vessels. 789 
Using recent technologies, such as infrared thermography (IRT) in condition 790 
monitoring and inspection techniques, can enable identification of the presence of any 791 
thermal anomalies in electrical appliances (Jadin and Taib, 2012). The rapid development of 792 
computer programs, sensor, and signal processing technologies, and integration with artificial 793 
intelligence (AI) techniques, has made it possible to implement fault diagnosis and prognosis 794 
effectively (Liu et al., 2007). Previous researchers stated that the use of AI software agents 795 
will become essential for monitoring, diagnosing, and predicting system equipment faults, 796 
particularly important to critical systems and components such as engines, power generation, 797 
and thermal management. 798 
 For a fire to occur there must be the three basic components forming the fire triangle, 799 
oxidizer, flammable material and a source of thermal energy. These factors combined 800 
together result in the spread of fire and often lead to tragic consequences. In order to avoid or 801 
control a fire, one of these factors should be avoided. Investigating the root causes of the 802 
previous accidents reveals that the fuel leakage is the consequence of different fire and 803 
explosion accidents occurring in the engine rooms (ATSB, 2008, 2016a; MAIB, 1999). In a 804 
ship, fire occurs mostly in the engine room due to the high chance of having all three factors 805 
simultaneously. Air (oxygen) and hot surfaces exist constantly in the engine room. When fuel 806 
or lubricant oil sprays on hot surfaces, there is high chance of a fire and explosion event due 807 
to the high flammability of conventional fuel or oil. Several questions such as ‘are there 808 
alternative fuels with less flammable property?’ and ‘does employing less flammable fuels or 809 




































































4. Alternative fuels 811 
 In this study, it is found that 31% fire and explosion accidents are caused by an 812 
accidental release of fuel or lubricating oil in the engine room. Replacing these highly 813 
flammable materials with other less flammable fuels may help to reduce the risk of ignition 814 
during accidental leakage. In the quest for less hazardous fuels, effectiveness of alternative 815 
fuels needs to be reviewed from safety perspectives. According to DNV report (Chryssakis et 816 
al., 2014), alternative fuels that are already used or could potentially be used in shipping in 817 
the future include LNG, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), biofuels, synthetic fuels (Fisher-818 
Tropsch) (Takeshita and Yamaji, 2008), methanol  and ethanol, Di-Methyl Ether (DME), 819 
biogas, hydrogen, biodiesel  nuclear fuel  and use of electricity for charging batteries and cold 820 
ironing.  The EMSA report (2017) states that the currently considered alternative fuels in 821 
shipping such as LNG, electricity, biodiesel, and methanol and other fuels such as LPG, 822 
ethanol, DME, biogas, synthetic fuels, hydrogen (particularly for use in fuel cells), and 823 
nuclear fuel, could play a role in the future. 824 
When analysing the viability and prospect of adoption of alternative fuels for use in 825 
shipping, safety considerations also need to be taken into account particularly the risks of fire 826 
and explosion accidents. In order to prevent or mitigate fire and explosion accidents in 827 
shipping, the effectiveness of alternative fuels needs to be assessed. The differences in 828 
chemistry and physical properties lead to different risks associated with transferring, 829 
dispensing, and handling alternative fuels. According to the EMSA (2017), one common 830 
challenge posed by the adoption of most alternative fuels is their physical and chemical 831 
characteristics, typically associated with low flashpoints, higher volatilities, different energy 832 
content per unit mass and in some cases toxicity.  833 
In the current study, only fire and explosion related hazards that could be posed by 834 




































































are not stored or handled appropriately. Astbury (2008) explained the ignition and 836 
combustion properties of alternative fuels in relation to fire and explosion hazards such as 837 
gross calorific value, octane number, flash point, flammable limits, auto-ignition temperature, 838 
electrical resistivity, minimum ignition energy, boiling point and water solubility. A summary 839 
of ignition and combustion properties of some proposed alternative fuels is given in Table 2. 840 
The author stated that most alternative fuels have similar ignition and combustion 841 
characteristics as existing known conventional fuels except hydrogen, and additional hazards 842 
posed by alternative fuels are manageable. The author further stated that the use of many 843 
alternative fuels requires some adjustment or substitution of minor parts of existing burner or 844 
engine designs to allow for direct substitution of traditional fuels. If this adjustment or 845 
substitution does not occur properly, the alternative fuel may not be used or likely becomes 846 
uneconomical and or presents more hazards. Maggio et al. (1991) stated that alternative fuels 847 
do not present greater risks than conventional fuels, however their risks are simply different. 848 
Thus, with proper training, facility design and adequate precautions, alternative fuels can be 849 
handled safely. 850 
Table 2. Ignition and combustion properties of some alternative fuels (Adopted from 851 
(Astbury, 2008)). 852 






















Ethanol 29.73 100 13 3.3-19 363 7.4×10
6 
f 
Methanol 22.72 99 11 6-36 385 3×10
3
 0.14 
LNG 19.98 >100 -188 5-15 537 Gas 0.28 
CrNG 19.98 120 Gas 5-15 537 N/A 0.28 
LPG 
(Propane) 




































































LH2 158.9 f Gas 4-75 500 10
17
 0.017 
Hydrogen 158.9 f Gas 4-75 500 N/A 0.017 
f = No data available 853 
The ignition and combustion properties of biodiesel are the same as those of 854 
conventional hydrocarbon oil-based diesel fuel, but it is a lower fire and explosion hazard 855 
than standard diesel because of a higher flash point. These properties make biodiesel and its 856 
blends with petroleum diesel safer to store, handle and use than conventional diesel fuel. 857 
Methanol has a low rate of evaporation and low radiant heat energy which makes it a 858 
safer fuel because it is less likely to ignite in accidents and less harmful to people when it 859 
does (Nowell, 1994). Moreover, methanol is much less likely than gasoline to ignite in open 860 
air (well-ventilated areas) due to its low volatility. Methanol in a closed tank should be 861 
considered an explosion hazard because methanol fuel-air mixture in closed air tanks is 862 
within its ignition limits (Maggio et al., 1991). However, in the case of spontaneous 863 
combustion, methanol is classified between gasoline and diesel fuel (MacCarley, 2013).  864 
Additionally, due to the lower volatility and higher flammable limit, pure methanol (M100) is 865 
projected to result in as much as a 90 percent reduction in the number of automotive fuel 866 
related fires compared to gasoline (Machiele, 1990). According to Fort (2011), METHAPU 867 
project has successfully demonstrated that the on-deck methanol tank and fuel cell system did 868 
not present any greater risk to the ship, occupants, or environment than that associated with 869 
conventional fuels. Risk assessments are carried out in Stena Germanica, SPIRETH project 870 
and Waterfront Shipping chemical tanker and were approved for installation, demonstrating 871 
that safety considerations are not a barrier to the use of methanol fuel systems on ships (Ellis 872 
and Tanneberger, 2015). Similar to methanol, ethanol fires are less hazardous than gasoline 873 




































































gasoline to store, transport and refuel (McWhorter, 2013). Thus, ethanol also presents a 875 
moderate fire and explosion hazard if handled incorrectly.  876 
The main hazard related to CrNG is gross leakage from the fuel feed pipe work. The 877 
potential for ignition immediately after the accident (leakages) is greater for CrNG than 878 
petrol as the flammable atmosphere will be far greater and likely to spread further and more 879 
quickly (Astbury, 2008). However, natural gas is safer than gasoline and diesel in many 880 
respects such as its ignition temperature is higher than gasoline and diesel and it is more 881 
difficult to ignite accidentally in comparison to both (Kowalewicz, 1984). Additionally, it is 882 
lighter than air and any leaks disperse rapidly upwards while gasoline and diesel pool on the 883 
ground, increasing the danger of fire (Semin, 2008). Thus, natural gas presents fewer fire or 884 
explosion hazards in well ventilated areas because of high auto-ignition temperature and 885 
narrow explosive range.  886 
LNG as a liquid is neither flammable nor explosive, but its vapour ignites when the 887 
vapour-air mixture is 5-15% (Kolwzan and Narewski, 2012). Fire and or explosion hazards 888 
related to LNG are similar to CrNG though other hazards are different, for example, LNG has 889 
roll-over and cryogenic hazards.  Use of LNG as an alternative fuel is promising and has the 890 
possibility of being a leading option in order to retain a substantial share of the world bunker 891 
market because it is proven technology (about 40 ships are currently running on LNG), and is 892 
meeting more than new emissions requirements and has less CO2 emissions (Semolinos et al., 893 
2013). Moreover, LNG is already providing an economic alternative to diesel in the heavy 894 
duty trucking industry, in port facility vehicles, and increasingly in marine and rail 895 
applications (Kumar et al., 2011; Litzke and Wegrzyn, 2001). Thus, similar to any flammable 896 
substance, appropriate design, regulations and personnel training are needed to maintain a 897 




































































LPG is highly flammable and its leakage from a fractured pipe would form a large 899 
persistent flammable atmosphere, which would likely ignite (Astbury, 2008). As it is heavier 900 
than air, it tends to settle in trenches or maintenance pits increasing explosion hazards. Leak 901 
prevention measure is key to mitigating these hazards. 902 
Hydrogen has a much lower minimum ignition energy (0.017 mJ) than any traditional 903 
hydrocarbon fuel and makes it far more sensitive to ignition than any other gaseous fuel 904 
(Astbury, 2008). Moreover, hydrogen has a much higher flame speed than any other gas and 905 
has wider flammable limits (4-75%) with higher explosion hazards (Astbury, 2008). 906 
Hydrogen ignition related accidents have occurred in the past resulting in severe 907 
consequences (Astbury and Hawksworth, 2007). Additional hazards may depend on its 908 
production and storage types.  909 
This shows that there are certain properties which make some fuels more or less 910 
hazardous than others and the severity of risks posed by each alternative fuel may not be the 911 
same. In order to mitigate the fire and or explosion hazards of alternative fuels for 912 
commercial applications, necessary precaution measures should be put in place with 913 
appropriate fail-safe designs and their cost effectiveness needs to be assessed. 914 
 Existing studies on alternative fuels in shipping are mostly focussed on the possibility 915 
of emission reductions, however, secondary effects because of emission reduction measures 916 
are not extensively studied. Luo (2013) identified 8 possible side effects of emissions 917 
reduction measures, including both positive and negative impacts on emission reduction, 918 
world trade, economic efficiency, and the local environment. Maddox consulting (2012), 919 
identified 13 measures that have a negative marginal abatement cost (MAC) on emissions 920 
reduction in shipping, and analysed the six categories of barriers to their successful 921 
implementation, including technological, operational (or physical), regulatory, economic, 922 




































































mainly assessed in relation to greenhouse gas reduction measures and not much emphasis is 924 
given to fire and explosion hazard reduction measures (Bouman et al., 2017; Hoffmann et al., 925 
2012). Grahn et al. (2013), analysed cost effectiveness of LNG, fuel cells, hydrogen, 926 
synthetic fuels (gas-to-liquid (GTL)) and biofuel using the Global Energy Transition model 927 
(GET-RC 6.2). This was conducted based on global energy system modelling aiming to 928 
analyse fuel choices in the shipping sector under stringent Carbon dioxide (CO2) constraints 929 
and reached the following conclusions; 930 
1. A transition from oil-based fuels to an alternative fuel could be cost-effective in the 931 
next 10-20 years,  932 
2. LNG could be a major fuel in the shipping sector between 2020 and 2070, depending 933 
on the cost of the storage tank,  934 
3. After 2070, a variety of fuels; hydrogen, synthetic fuels and biofuels will be chosen 935 
depending on the characteristic of the ship, 936 
4. Time of transition and fuel choices are affected by the chosen target of CO2 937 
concentration, energy demand scenarios and the total supply of oil and natural gas. 938 
Findings of another study conducted by Taljegard et al. (2014) support these 939 
conclusions and state that (i) it is cost-effective to start the phase out of fuel oil within the 940 
shipping sector in the next decade; (ii) natural gas based fuels (liquefied natural gas and 941 
methanol) are the most probable substitutes during the study period; (iii) availability of 942 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), the CO2 target, the liquefied natural gas tank cost and 943 
potential oil resources affect marine fuel choices significantly; and (iv) biofuels rarely play a 944 
major role in the shipping sector, due to limited supply and competition for bioenergy from 945 
other energy sectors. However, neither study incorporated all variables nor uncertainties such 946 
as engine efficiency, regulatory impact and cost of technology replacement or modification 947 




































































analysing cost effectiveness from safety perspective of alternative fuels incorporating 949 
adequate parameters in sensitivity analysis. 950 
Regardless of inherent hazards and many uncertainties such as availability, cost and 951 
technology, some alternative fuels are already being used in marine vessels as a prime mover. 952 
Examples of marine vessels running on alternative fuels are (1) MS Bergensfjord (LNG 953 
fuelled RO-PAX), (2) Viking Lady (LNG Fuelled, also demonstrator project for Fuels Cells 954 
in the context of the FellowSHIP project) and (3) MV Stena Germanica (First Methanol 955 
fuelled ship conversion) (EMSA, 2017).  956 
The proposed alternative fuels have both advantages and disadvantages at this stage in 957 
relation to fire and or explosion hazards and would demand further research in many aspects. 958 
Due to this, it is highly unlikely that any single technology or fuel has the potential to be the 959 
‘‘silver bullet’’ to be able to meet energy challenge and security, and mitigate the effects of 960 
climate change and other harmful environmental impacts, because all the options are subject 961 
to constraints of some kind (Ball and Wietschel, 2009).  962 
From the initial stage of the development of alternative fuels and technologies, the 963 
consideration of fire and explosion hazard mitigation measures could play a significant role 964 
in reducing fire and explosion accidents in shipping. Comparing flammability properties of 965 
potential alternative fuels, some alternative fuels have favourable and safer properties than 966 
traditional fuels, which certainly minimise the risks of fire and explosion if adequate 967 
precautions are adopted. 968 
5. Conclusions 969 
Fire and explosion accidents are reported as a common accident type in maritime 970 
transportation. Fire and explosion accidents that occurred in maritime transportation between 971 
1990 and 2015 are reviewed and analysed in order to identify causal and underlying causes of 972 




































































categorised as human error, thermal reaction, electrical fault, mechanical failures and 974 
unknown.  975 
The general causes of fire and explosion accidents in shipping show that human error 976 
is the most common contributing factor accounting for 48% of accidents. In most cases, it is 977 
found that skill based error, inadequate supervision and inadequate organisational processes 978 
have resulted in mechanical failures, chemical reactions and electrical fault. Moreover, it is 979 
found that 43% of human error is arose from maintenance related activities.  HEM, better 980 
safety culture, design integration and system management, and neuro-ergonomics design are 981 
seen as some key approaches in managing human failure. 982 
In this study, it is found that mechanical failure contributed to 22% of fire and 983 
explosion accidents. Deficient maintenance activity and inappropriate overhauls have been 984 
the main contributors to leakage and mechanical failure. Mechanical failure can be prevented 985 
by controlling corrosion, fatigue failure, and wear and creep which are further mitigated by 986 
adequate design and safety systems. Investigations of shipping accidents have shown that in 987 
most cases fire originated in the engine room and was caused by leakage of oil or fuel coming 988 
into contact with hot exhausts. It is suggested that the failure of engineering components can 989 
be controlled or prevented by proper design, better materials selection, avoiding 990 
manufacturing defects and overloading, and adequate maintenance. 991 
Hot metal surfaces, static electricity and electrical sparks and arcs are the major 992 
sources of ignition causing fire and explosion. In this study, about 7% of accidents are found 993 
to be caused by electrical fires. The main contributing factors for electrical fires are improper 994 
altercations, improper initial installation, and deterioration due to aging, improper use, 995 
inadequate capacity and faulty product. Some studies claimed that investigators considered a 996 
fire as electrical without definite evidence which led to the ruling out of other potential 997 




































































discussed in this paper are considered as electrical fires based on circumstantial evidences. 999 
Uses of arc-resistant switchboards and arc-fault detection systems such as automatic arc-fault 1000 
protection can significantly reduce the risks of fire and shock. Moreover, application of smart 1001 
grid similar to the modern land-based electrical system would help to better manage the 1002 
electrical system in ships. It has been proposed that using recent technologies such as infrared 1003 
thermography and AI in condition monitoring and inspection techniques may enable 1004 
identification of the presence of any anomalies in electrical appliances or systems. 1005 
Thermal reaction has contributed 14% to fire and explosion accidents, and breach of 1006 
guidelines or policies was found to be the main root cause of accident. Defective packaging, 1007 
inadequate hazard identification and incorrect stowage have contributed to accidents in 1008 
shipping. Additionally, undeclared dangerous goods due to lack of awareness of regulations, 1009 
mistakes or omissions during cargo transport booking, and deliberate non-declaration, are 1010 
also  significant contributors to shipping accidents. In order to mitigate fire and or explosion 1011 
from reaction, a robust and extensive hazard identification procedure or tool is needed and all 1012 
stakeholders, including manufacturers and those involved in a transport chain, should be 1013 
accountable for safe handling of commodities. Adequate safety analysis and effective training 1014 
and education are found to be common recommendation in most accidents caused by thermal 1015 
reaction. Moreover, it is found that in 9% of accidents, investigators could not conclusively 1016 
identify causes of accidents. This shows that accident investigation may need more rigorous 1017 
approaches and experts.   1018 
 All fuels are prone to fire and or explosion risks, however, some fuels are less prone 1019 
to risk of fire and explosion because of differences in flammability and combustion properties. 1020 
In order to compare the fire and explosion hazards posed by different fuels, properties of 1021 
some proposed alternative fuels are compared and it is found that at this stage, adoption of 1022 




































































CrNG and methanol have suitable properties for mitigating fire and explosion hazards and 1024 
appropriate management of their hazards could be safer than traditional fuels. The proposed 1025 
alternative fuels have weaknesses and strengths in relation to fire and or explosion hazards 1026 
and demands further studies in many aspects. Due to the lack of adequate studies and 1027 
technological immaturity, at this stage, it is highly unlikely that any single alternative fuel has 1028 
the potential to be able to mitigate fire and explosion risks, to meet energy challenge and 1029 
security, and to mitigate the effects of climate change. 1030 
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